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PREFACE 
Because of the difficulties and the space limitation, 
this thesis presents only the first fragments of a larger, 
more exciting project. Originally I had intended to offer 
an alternative to the traditional understanding about the 
relationship between David Hume and Immanuel Kant. I was 
attempting to change the traditional view by focusing on the 
unnoticed agreement Hume and Kant had concerning the 
significant role imagination played in our epistemic 
experience. This paper will only present my findings as 
they relate to the Hume half of the story. Hume is 
presented as a revolutionary scientist who was trying to 
reconceptualize human understanding as an extension of 
natural abilities, which we shared with other natural 
organisms. I attempt to highlight Hume's attempt to develop 
and clarify the way this naturalism expresses itself through 
imagination. 
Even with this restricted focus my thesis would never 
have been completed without the encouragement of many 
people. I am especially indebted to Dr. Dick Eggerman for 
two reasons. After hearing my first intuitions concerning 
Hume, Kant, and imagination he was wise enough to encourage 
me to pursue the subject more deeply. Later, during the 
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many drafts, his desire for clarity and intelligibility 
forced me to produce a more understandable paper. I owe 
Dr. Ed Lawry a debt of gratitude not only because he headed 
up my committee but also for his patience and flexibility. 
(How many other instructors would accept a paper two years 
after it was due?) A special thanks to Dr. Doren Recker. 
Every once in a while you meet a kindred spirit and I 
consider my meeting Doren to be one of those occasions. The 
historical orientation in this paper is a result of his 
impressing on me the importance this kind of an approach. 
Hopefully I will be able to emulate your philosophical 
example of creativity, tenacity and clarity. My thesis 
benefited immeasurably from our many lengthy conversations. 
Lastly, I would like to thank all three for their judicious 
criticism and the way they delivered these criticisms with 
large doses of encouragement. 
Fortunately, there is more to life than doing 
philosophy. I would also like to thank some people who did 
not directly shape this paper but their efforts still 
contributed to its completion. A special friend, Brenda 
Simons set a very good example by finishing her thesis 
before me--even though she started after I had begun. Not 
only did she make exceptionally good editorial suggestions 
but her friendship was a welcome relief to the sometimes 
frustrating experience of trying to express myself clearly 
on paper. 
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Lastly I would like to thank my parents. My mom has 
never doubted that I would get this thesis done. Without my 
dad allowing me to live with him in Norman, while I pursued 
studies at the University of Oklahoma, I would never have 
had the free time to get this thesis finished. Thanks to 
both of you. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Initial Idea 
The beginning of the this paper can be traced to a 
desperate graduate student looking for an appropriate thesis 
topic. During this time he starts an independent reading 
with one of his committee members (Dick Eggerman) which 
centered on Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 
Nothing exceptional happened until Dr. Eggerman suggested 
that I reread David Hurne, the assumption being that Kant was 
responding to Hume's skeptical conclusions. Since I had 
already read the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding and 
had in the past bought a copy of the Treatise of Human 
Nature, it seemed philosophically obvious in fulfilling this 
request to read the Treatise. 
In the Treatise I found a new Hume, one who was not 
purely skeptical but seemed to be pursuing a more 
constructive endeavor: "An Attempt to introduce the 
experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects." But 
what really struck me was the way imagination moved from a 
place of insignificance in the beginning of the Treatise to 
a place of problematical prominence by the end of Book I. 
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With my eyes opened, so to speak, I began to discern 
something similar occurring in Kant's Critique. 
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I was intrigued by what I deemed as an undiscussed 
similarity in their description of the human cognitive 
experience. Was it by chance that both these philosophers 
seemed compelled, in their first major works, to initiate a 
preliminary investigation into the role imagination played 
in our epistemic experience? When I realized that these two 
drastically dissimilar philosophers both dropped imagination 
into the oblivion of the unmentioned in their later works, 
my intrigue turned into amazement. Inwardly I wondered: 
Why should two philosophers as different as Hume and Kant 
have identical reactions in response to their preliminary 
findings concerning imagination? 
After discussing these matters with Dr. Eggerman and 
showing him some of my textual evidence, he suggested that 
an investigation into the role of imagination in the 
philosophies of Hume and Kant might be suitable for a good 
thesis. I began tentatively to pursue this suggestion. 
Upon hearing this thesis proposal Ed Lawry, another member 
of my committee, gave me a copy of Martin Heidegger's Kant 
and the Problem of Metaphysics and asked me to read it. In 
this book Heidegger described, in a way much clearer than I 
had yet perceived, a similar movement of the imagination 
(from insignificance to prominence) in Kant's Critique. It 
was this confirmation which convinced me to make my thesis 
focus: The role of imagination in Burne's and Kant's 
philosophies. 
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Except for one small suggestion made by Doren Recker 
(the newest member on my committee), my first draft took the 
general pounding most first drafts take. Dr. Recker's 
suggestion centered on the meaning of 'imagination' for Burne 
and his contemporaries; was it different from what I had 
assumed--had I checked to see if it meant the same thing to 
them that it did to me? 
Obviously, in light of the subject matter of my thesis, 
if I had made a wrong assumption, then it could create the 
need for more than just a reorganization and clearer 
presentation of my ideas; it could involve· a change in my 
position. Luckily, it actually reinforced my earlier 
historical intuitions concerning what David Burne was up to 
in the Treatise. 
The Transitional Phase 
In the process of answering Dr. Recker's question I 
began to realize how inadequate my grasp was of the 
historical context in which David Burne expressed himself. I 
neither knew of those who may have influenced his position 
or established the issues he may have been addressing within 
the pages of his Treatise. Once I widened my field of 
interest, I was amazed at the diversity of issues being 
addressed by Burne's contemporaries and thus also by Burne. 
4 
One aspect of my original thesis became a victim of 
this historical approach, viz. my belief that Burne's focus 
on imagination exemplified an unprecedented starting point 
from which to examine the phenomenon of human understanding. 
What I perceived as Burne's original emphasis on the role of 
imagination in our ordinary epistemic experience was in 
reality evidence of my historical ignorance. In fact, it 
was a French priest, Father Malebranche, who first began to 
draw attention to the unnoticed and, as he would argue, 
often unreliable role imagination plays in our epistemic 
experience. I became convinced that Malebranche had not 
only influenced David Burne directly but also, and more 
importantly, indirectly through his popularization of a 
Cartesian philosophy of the brain. 
It was in regards to this Cartesian philosophy of the 
brain that lady luck had been very good to me. To 
understand why, let me briefly describe the Burne I 
discovered in the Treatise. Earlier I mentioned that the 
Burne of the Treatise seemed to be pursuing a more 
constructive endeavor. Burne's positive project could be 
described as an attempt to ground our epistemic experiences 
in man concretely conceived as a natural organism. This 
contrasted with attempts, since the Greek philosophers, to 
understand human epistemic experiences in terms of man as a 
rational animal. Against this overly rationalistic picture, 
Burne argued that human knowing was merely an outgrowth of 
capacities which we shared with other natural organisms. 
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How does this way of reading Hume relate to the 
Cartesian philosophy of the brain and the general context of 
his historical situation? Without going into great detail 
now, let me just say that Descartes held to a mechanistic 
conception of imagination--one which relied on a causal 
connection. To see the connection one only needs to combine 
Descartes' claim that animals were merely machines with 
Burne's claim, in the section titled "Of the Reason of 
Animals," that an animal's reasoning "is not in itself 
different, nor founded on different principles, from that 
which appears in human nature."l 
It was this kind of a significant historical connection 
and others like it that made me feel that I needed to 
include these findings in my thesis, and yet there did not 
seem to be any way to smoothly integrate the new material 
with the overall structure of the original thesis. One of 
the reasons I struggled to integrate the historical element 
with my original focus on imagination centered on the 
historicity of language. For me, this phrase came to 
indicate more than the trivial fact that the meaning 
associated with a certain word changes over time. 
trivial fact can become very significant when, as 
Dr. Recker's question indicated, it affects how we 
understand a historical text.) 
(This 
It became clear to me that in the case of Hume and Kant 
the problem centered on how to say something new with 'old 
words' and the meanings traditionally associated with them. 
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For example, as I read the Treatise, I was struck by the 
unusual way Hume attempted to use the word "custom." He was 
attempting to associate custom with an element of necessity 
which is alien to the range of meanings associated with its 
modern usage. 
Finding a Framework 
As I struggled with this problem, it dawned on me that 
hermeneutical philosophers were interested in some of the 
same issues I was becoming concerned about--such as the 
historicity of human understanding, the conflict between 
tradition and originality, and the intricacy of interpreting 
a historical text. I began to picture my thesis topic, the 
role of imagination in the philosophy of Hume and Kant, as a 
concrete case for illustrating some larger hermeneutical 
issues. 
A very brief outline of the original project would be 
as follows: 
1. Discussion over some of the general concerns of 
hermeneutical philosophers. 
2. Explanation of how a new reading of Hume and Kant 
which emphasized imagination would be a good 
concrete case for examining the previously 
discussed concerns. 
3. A discussion about the twofold social role language 
plays in our form of life and the tensions it 
creates. This twofoldness of language comes into 
view when we examine its role as both a social 
institution (and thus a mediator of tradition) or 
the tool used by individuals for expressing 
"original" insights (i.e., by definition 
nontraditional). 
4. Justification that both Hume and Kant struggled 
with this problem and yet being overlooked by the 
traditional reading of both philosophers. 
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5. An examination of how this oversight by the 
traditional reading makes possible a new reading of 
Hume and Kant which emphasizes the similarity of 
their findings concerning imagination and then 
argues that this agreement points to what is 
significant in their findings. 
6. An attempt to read Hume in this new way. 
7. An attempt to read Kant in this new way. 
8. Examination of whether these new readings have 
established themselves as being both credible and 
interesting. 
9. If this is a legitimate interpretation of Hume and 
Kant, then what lessons do Hume and Kant have to 
teach us concerning the right way to proceed in our 
attempts to develop a more accurate conception of 
human understanding? 
Hopefully, this outline makes clear why the original 
thesis topic cannot be presented at this time. From a 
practical perspective it became to large of a task to handle 
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in a length appropriate for a master's thesis. Also, the 
hermeneutical framework I wanted to use tended to 
destabilize the focus of the paper: moving the focus off 
imagination and onto hermeneutics. This unresolved tension 
created an ambiguity in regards to the real focus of my 
thesis. Because of these two problems, I will here present 
only my initial findings concerning the larger project. In 
the future, these preliminary findings will, hopefully, be 
incorporated into my original vision. (A hint from the 
author about how to read this paper. This paper naturally 
breaks into two equal parts. The first part (pages 9-45) 
discusses the other interpretations of Hume and accumulates 
those elements I think these readings have either overlooked 
or ignored. The second part (pages 46-81) attempts a 
reading of Hume's Treatise which is informed by these 
overlooked elements.) 
CHAPTER II 
HERMENEUTICAL ISSUES AND HUME'S TREATISE 
Modern Readers and an Old Text 
One of the issues which hermeneutical philosophers have 
made us sensitive to is the kind of complexities which 
surround any attempt to understand a historical text. 
Philosophers express themselves in language, and the 
language they use does not exist in an ahistorical or 
acultural manner. This creates two kinds of difficulties: 
one assumes a historical gap between reader and author, the 
other assumes the reader and author are contemporaries. 
One of the problems created by the historical gap 
centers on the fact that the meaning associated with a 
specific word can change over time. A timely example of 
this would be the way Locke understands the word ''custom." 
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he writes: 
Some of our ideas have a natural Correspondence 
and Connexion one with another . . . Besides this 
there is another Connexion of ideas wholly owing 
to Chance or Custom; ideas that in themselves are 
not at all of kin, come to be so united in some 
Men's Minds, that 'tis very hard to separate them, 
they always keep in company, and the one no sooner 
at any time comes into the Understanding but its 
Associate appears with it . 
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This strong Combination of Ideas, not ally'd by 
Nature, the Mind makes in it self either 
voluntarily, or by chance, and hence it comes in 
different men to be very different, according to 
their different Inclinations, Educations, 
Interests, etc. Custom settles habits of Thinking 
in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in 
the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which 
seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal 
Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the 
same steps they have been used to, which by often 
treading are worn into a smooth path, and the 
Motion in it becomes easy and as it were Natural.2 
The important thing to notice is the description given in 
the last line concerning how the nervous fluids engrave 
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traces in the brain as a result of repeated experience. In 
other words, Locke believed that the principle of custom 
could be explained in terms of some kind of mechanical 
action. It is this mechanistic grounding of 'custom' that 
creates the "strong Combination of Ideas". 
This understanding of 'custom' contrasts sharply with 
that which characterizes modern usage. To see this the 
reader needs only to consult any dictionary, such as 
Webster's II. There custom is defined as: 
1. A practice followed as a matter of course among a 
people. 
2. A habitual practice of an individual. 
3. A common tradition or usage so long established 
that it has the force or validity of law. 
In all the entries, 'custom' is usually associated with 
something relative to the social practices of a given 
society. What is conspicuously absent is any explanation of 
its abilities in mechanistic terms. 
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Generally, most philosophical investigations begin with 
a modern reading of a text. A hermeneutical methodology 
questions whether this is the appropriate manner for 
obtaining a correct understanding of what that particular 
philosopher is trying to say. Initially, the modern reader 
should seek to situate the text within its historical and 
cultural context. Words playing a prominent role in the 
text, such as ''imagination" and "custom" in the Treatise, 
need to be given the same meaning which they had for the 
author and his contemporaries. Only then may we arrive at 
an accurate understanding of what that philosopher is trying 
to say. 
A related or similar problem results from our trivial 
capacity to use different words to describe the same 
perspective or idea. Let us designate this problem as the 
existence of "terminological idiom" in the text. I use this 
phrase to indicate how a culture's technical language may 
not be recognized as such, since it has been replaced by 
modern terminology. Certainly a methodological perspective 
may remain the same while the technical language through 
which it is expressed changes over time. This linguistic 
fact creates the potential for misunderstanding a historical 
text. Misunderstanding occurs because the words no longer 
call forth the same kind of cultural associations they had 
at the time the author used them. For the modern reader 
these words become a kind of "terminological idiom," words 
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which communicate little or no meaning, or worse, the wrong 
meaning. 
For example, the guiding thought behind the research 
program now called "cognitive psychology" would, in Hume's 
day, have been discussed in terms of "animal spirits." Our 
modern attempt to model epistemic states in terms of 
computer programs had its predecessor in the 'brain traces 
carved by animal spirit' explanation for epistemic states. 
·But, for a modern reader unfamiliar with what this phrase 
meant, it becomes a terminological idiom which fails to 
effectively communicate. 
Could the overall thrust of Hume's Treatise have been 
misunderstood as a result of not noticing the existence of 
this kind of "terminological idiom"? An example of this in 
the Treatise is the many references Hume makes to "animal 
spirits." Let me illustrate this by quoting from several 
places where Hume uses this phrase in the Treatise. 
Twou'd have been easy to have made an imaginary 
dissection of the brain, and have shewn, why upon 
our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run 
into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the 
other ideas, that are related to it .•. any idea 
it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits 
into that region of the brain, in which the idea 
is plac'd; these spirits always excite the idea, 
when they run precisely into the proper traces, 
and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea. 
But as their motion is seldom direct, and 
naturally turns a little to the one side or the 
other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling 
into the contiguous traces, present other related 
ideas in lieu of that which the mind desir'd at 
first to survey. (pages 60-61; referred to later 
in the thesis, page 77) 
The vividness of the first conception diffuses 
itself along the relations, and is convey'd, as by 
so many pipes or canals, to every idea that has 
any communication with the primary one. (page 
122) 
As nature has given to the body certain appetites 
and inclinations, which she increases, diminishes, 
or changes according to the situation of the· 
fluids; she has proceeded in the same manner with 
the mind. (page 368) 
Would Hume's many references to "animal spirits" or just 
13 
"spirits" bring to the modern reader's mind the same kind of 
scientific associations it had for Hume and his original 
readers? 
Both of the problems just considered assume a 
historical gap which must be overcome if a modern reader is 
to correctly grasp what the author meant at the time he 
wrote the text. In the first problem, the reader assumes he 
knows what the author means by his words. In the case of 
terminological idiom, the reader probably guesses at what 
the words mean and is aware of this fact. In either case, 
the recognition of these difficulties is enough to show the 
concerned reader how he may minimize these problems. Thus, 
these preceding paragraphs are the justification for my 
later attempts to situate Hume within the historical and 
cultural context which imbued his thinking and writing. 
Old Words and New Ideas 
Unlike the previous problems, which can be minimized if 
a modern reader attempts to read Hume as his 18th century 
contemporaries would, the next set of problems result from 
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the historical and cultural context which Hume shared with 
his contemporaries. The medium which makes it possible for 
Hume and his contemporaries to share a historical and 
cultural context is language. Unfortunately, the process by 
which language acquires this ability may later conflict with 
another purpose which language is also expected to fulfill. 
Generally speaking, conflict results when ordinary language 
is called upon to express a new and original perspective. 
The reader may clearly grasp this conflict if he 
reminds himself about the way an arbitrary sign or sound is 
transformed into a word with meaning. This transformation 
occurs as one gets initiated, by the community, into the 
usage of a sign. But this fact implies that the meaning of 
a word is rooted in the way the sign was used in the past. 
If this element of pastness ended with the establishment of 
a sign's meaning, then there would not be a problem. 
However, the preceding linguistic tradition also claims a 
'controlling interest' over any future use of this word. 
This legislative claim creates problems for anyone who, like 
Hume, is trying to articulate a fresh perspective or 
original thought. 
This second difficulty centers on the fact that a word 
is like a linguistic reservoir which maintains, as a present 
reality, a~l the presuppositions and value judgments of the 
previous language users. The meanings and perspectives 
associated with these words represent a theoretical and 
pragmatic tradition embodying what they viewed as important. 
Over time these words were tailor-made to fit what the 
innovator's predecessor found interesting and significant. 
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As a result, the first problem the innovator encounters 
could be described as the inadequacy of the old language to 
express his new perspective or thought. Since the words and 
the conventions controlling what these words mean summarize 
what previous language users deemed important, the innovator 
may find himself hard pressed to find any words or concepts 
suitable for expressing the exact point he is wanting to 
make. Notice how this problem is unavoidable. Language 
must capture what the society deems as important or, 
practically speaking, it would be useless. 
That this linguistic fact is unavoidable does not help 
the innovator solve his original problem. The only way 
through this impasse is to give an old word a new meaning by 
using it in a manner deviating from its previous or 
traditional usage. However, if he attempts to do this, he 
runs into the second problem. He is accused of misusing 
words, or worse, of speaking nonsense! If he tries to avoid 
this difficulty by sticking close to common usage then 
regrettably, since conventional usage embodies the 
perspective of the author's contemporaries, his attempt to 
say something "new" is often misinterpreted by his 
contemporaries. They either misunderstand the main point of 
his teaching or understand only minor points and thus 
distort the overall value of his contribution. An 
innovator's use of words, in communicating a new 
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perspective, cannot avoid confronting the counter thrust of 
conventional usage. 
Checking for a Fit 
The previous paragraphs on the tension between the 
traditional or conservative element in our social language 
and its use as a tool to express an individual's new 
perspective is wasted unless these issues apply to Hume. I 
believe that they do. For example, in the Treatise Hume 
claims to be putting forward a new foundation for the 
science of man: 
In pretending therefore to explain the principles 
of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat 
system of the sciences, built on a foundation 
almost entirely new, and the only one upon which 
they can stand with any security.3 
When commenting on his Treatise in an Abstract he published 
later, Hume not only strengthens his claim to new 
discoveries but also points to one as especially novel: 
Thro' this whole book, there are great pretensions 
to new discoveries in philosophy; but if any thing 
can entitle the author to so glorious a name as 
that of an inventor, 'tis the use he makes of the 
principle of the association of ideas, which 
enters into most of his philosophy.4 
These quotes make it clear that Hume self-consciously 
believed that he was doing something new and original. 
If he was attempting to say something new, then we 
would expect him to have a vague feeling that the old 
language was not an adequate vehicle for expressing exactly 
the point he was trying to make. Did he say anything like 
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this in the Treatise? Yes, he did. After finishing a dense 
discussion into the causes of belief, he writes: 
I must not conclude this subject without 
observing, that 'tis very difficult to talk of the 
operations of the mind with perfect propriety and 
exactness; because common language has seldom made 
any very nice distinctions among them, but has 
generally call'd by the same term all such as 
nearly resemble each other. And as this is a 
source almost inevitable of obscurity and 
confusion in the author; so it may frequently give 
rise to doubts and objections in the reader, which 
otherwise he wou'd never have dream'd of.5 
In this quote Burne, with his characteristic clarity, takes 
note of the problem which I previously discussed as the 
inadequacy of the old language to express the new 
perspective or thought. 
Was Burne aware that his inventive attempt to explain 
all the sciences in terms of the principle of human nature 
had been misunderstood by his contemporaries because of its 
originality? He seems to suggest as much in the Abstract: 
Tis sufficient, if I can make the learned world 
apprehend, that there is some difficulty in the 
case, and that who-ever solves the difficulty must 
say some thing very new and extraordinary; as new 
as the difficulty itself.6 
In this quote Burne expresses his belief that whoever solves 
this difficulty must be committed to the task of using old 
words to say new things and that this individual must be 
evaluated with this requirement in mind. 
Conflicting Interpretations 
I will use the two difficulties (the historical gap and 
the tension between old and new) just discussed as a 
touchstone to distinguish my reading of Burne from both a 
traditional one, as well as Kemp-Smith's. 
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In a traditional reading of Burne, he is often portrayed 
as the last in a trio of empiricist philosophers which began 
with Locke. On the traditional reading it is not an 
accident that Burne is the last empiricist philosopher. For 
the tradition pictures Burne as the empiricist philosopher 
par excellence who logically thought through the 
presuppositions of empiricism to their skeptical 
conclusions. Thus, Burne's direct contribution was largely 
negative, and only indirectly (by awakening Kant from his 
dogmatic slumbers) did he have a positive influence. This 
briefly describes the Hume most freshman philosophy students 
are introduced to. 
I agree with Kemp-Smith that this traditional reading 
of Burne overemphasizes Hume's negative purposes at the 
expense of his more positive or constructive purposes. 
Overall, my reading of Burne can be identified with what is 
commonly called Burne's philosophical naturalism, first 
popularized by Norman Kemp-Smith? in the early twentieth 
century and recently refined and developed by Barry Stroud 
in his book Bume.8 They insist that Burne's teaching 
consisted of more than just a negative skeptical thrust, 
that he also had a positive aim in his philosophical 
program. Barry Stroud believes that Bume used his skeptical 
arguments to discredit "a largely inherited or a priori 
framework of thinking about human nature--in particular 
19 
about man's rationality."9 John Wright believes another 
target of Burne's skeptical arguments are the theological 
conclusions drawn by Malebranche, and the modern Cartesians, 
who deny all power and activity in second causes and ascribe 
all to God.10 In neither of these examples is Burne's 
skepticism an expression of a general attitude towards the 
world; it has a specific target, though the targets 
themselves introduce a certain generality into the 
discussion. In both cases he tries to replace these 
conceptions with a naturalistic alternative. 
The skeptical or negative Burne emphasized by the 
traditional reading may be traced to his contemporaries who, 
for theological reasons, were unwilling to see the positive 
implications of his philosophical naturalism. John Yelton 
described how: 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Great 
Britain are marked by a general and persistent 
concern about threats to orthodoxy in religion. 
Many doctrines and views were seen as threatening: 
theories about the origin and nature of human 
knowledge, ... claims about human nature,. 11 
Burne's attempts to develop a naturalistic explanation for 
human understanding had put him at cross purposes with many 
of his contemporaries. 
If Burne's contemporaries perceived his philosophical 
project as a threat, then this may explain the overly 
negative picture they had of Burne. This becomes more 
plausible if we remember that Burne was trying to say 
something new and thus, as we have seen, was already 
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susceptible to misinterpretation. Whatever the reasons for 
the traditional picture of Burne the skeptic, one of the 
purposes of this paper is to supplement it with Burne the 
scientist. 
In spite of my agreement with Kemp-Smith's attempt to 
balance the skeptical Burne with a naturalistic Burne, we 
differ on how to conceptualize Burne's naturalism. My 
reading of Burne's naturalism diverges from Kemp-Smith in two 
important ways. Against Kemp-Smith I will argue first that 
.Bume holds to a full-bodied naturalism and second that in 
the Treatise this naturalism manifests itself in the form of 
a psychophysiological conception of imagination (which was 
first suggested by Descartes). Kemp-Smith acknowledges, in 
a footnote, that: 
Bume sought, it is true, to get behind both 
sympathy and belief, and to account for them in a 
mechanistic manner, ••. Both, however, it should 
be noted are in themselves, for Burne, more certain 
than any explanation that can be offered of 
them.12 
Yet he bemoans this Newtonian influence because it 
"exercises a disturbing influence on the argument of the 
first two books of the Treatise."l3 I hope to reverse this 
value judgment and show that, far from disturbing the 
arguments of the Treatise, it is actually the anchor 
securing those things Burne wants to maintain, like our 
common sense and our scientific beliefs. 
Paralleling Kemp-Smith's desire to deny a mechanistic 
conception of Burne's naturalism is his disowning the faculty 
through which it worked--imagination! Kemp-Smith's final 
opinion on the role of imagination in Burne's philosophy is 
that: 
Burne's ascription of primacy to the imagination 
has no greater importance in the philosophy of the 
Treatise than that of being merely a corollary to 
his early doctrine of belief.14 
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But, even on a superficial reading of the Treatise, it would 
be hard not to notice the important role imagination plays 
in Burne's philosophical system. 
Since my reading of Burne will bring me into conflict 
with Kemp-Smith's influential interpretation of Burne's 
naturalism, which emphasizes the natural priority of feeling 
over reason, let me give some of my reasons for questioning 
his interpretation. 
First, I question Kemp-Smith's identification of Burne's 
"new Scene of Thought" with his reading of Hutcheson. Kemp-
Smith identifies Hutcheson as a primary influence on Burne's 
teaching and argues for the thesis: 
That it was under the direct influence of Francis 
Hutcheson that he was led to recognise that 
judgments of moral approval and disapproval, .. 
are based not on rational insight or on evidence, 
but solely on feeling.15 
No doubt it was a part of this "new Scene," yet it may have 
been only one component among many (see Hendel) .16 In this 
paper I hope to show that Kemp-Smith has exaggerated 
Hutcheson's influence on Burne, slanting his portrayal of 
Burne's naturalism. I will let Kemp-Smith describe how 
Hutcheson's teaching influenced Burne: 
. if the fundamental judgments of morals, as 
of aesthetics, rest on feeling, not on reason; and 
if in matters of moral conduct Nature has been 
thus careful in providing us, independently of all 
calculation and reflexion, with these 'immediate 
monitors', may it not be so likewise in the 
professedly theoretical field? May not our so-
called judgments of knowledge in regard to matters 
of fact and existence be really acts of belief, 
not of knowledge--belief being a passion and not a 
form of insight, and therefore like all passions, 
fixed and predetermined by the de facto frame and 
constitution of our human nature?17 
In general, I agree with this paragraph and, in light of 
Kemp-Smith's overall thesis, have reservations only about 
the statement: "belief being a passion." 
In his book The Philosophy of David Hume, Kemp-Smith 
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attempts to portray passion as a belief-producing mechanism 
in matters of fact and existence. My problem with this 
picture is that it ignores Hume's account of it, in the 
Treatise, in terms of "custom operating upon imagination."l8 
Later, in the Abstract, Hurne writes in regards to the 
principles of association: 
For as it is by means of thought only that any 
thing operates upon our passions, and as these are 
the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to 
us the cement of the universe, and all the 
operation of the mind must, in a great measure, 
depend on them.19 
Contra Kemp-Smith, Hume argues that the passions are ac'ted 
on by thought and that what we think depends "in a great 
measure" on the principles of association. 
Of course, if a connection can be established between 
Hume's phrase "principles of association" and a Cartesian 
philosophy of the brain, then Kemp-Smith's desire to replace 
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this feature of Hume's thought with passions is consistent 
with his desire to purge Hume's philosophy of any form of 
mechanism. If this is so, then it indicates another reason 
why I reject Kemp-Smith's interpretation. Instead of 
attempting to read Hume as his contemporaries would, he is 
trying to mold Hume in light of his own philosophical 
convictions. This is not wrong per se, but it almost 
guarantees that Hume's philosophy will be misinterpreted. 
CHAPTER III 
WIDENING THE HISTORICAL HORIZON 
Making the Mechanistic Connection 
I agree with Kemp-Smith's attempt to understand Hume in 
light of those who may have influenced him, such as 
Hutcheson. I only want to widen the historical focus and 
examine other sources which may have contributed to the "new 
Scene of Thought," which prompted Hume to write his 
Treatise. 
Evidently Hume had, before the age of twenty, thought 
about the subject of religion and had recorded these 
thoughts in a notebook. About the time he began to write 
the Dialogues, he burned this earlier notebook, and yet he 
seems to have overlooked a few stray leaves of paper which 
survived to the present. On these he wrote: 
There is a remarkable story to confirm the 
Cartesian philosophy of the brain. A man hurt by 
the fall of a horse, forgot about twenty years of 
his life, and remembered what went before in a 
much more lively manner than usual.20 
Hendel believes that these remarks, on a confirmation of the 
Cartesian philosophy of the brain, predate his later 
discovery of Hutcheson (Kemp-Smith disputes the dating21). 
If true, it seems plausible that Hume had somehow 
synthesized these two components. (The last line is 
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noteworthy because it gives Hume's description of the first 
person phenomenal characteristics which he associates with a 
Cartesian philosophy of the brain.) 
Another timely historical fact helps to establish 
Hume's commitment to a Cartesian philosophy of the brain. 
In 1734, before Hume had composed the Treatise, he had been 
suffering from some kind of physical malady, and he sought 
medical advice from a well-read Scottish physician. During 
this letter he describes how his practice of a Stoic 
lifestyle led to a wasting of his spirit and compares his 
experience to those French mystics. 
As this kind of devotion depends entirely on the 
force of passion, and consequently of the animal 
spirits, I have often thought that their case and 
mine were pretty parallel, and that their 
rapturous admirations might discompose the fabric 
of the nerves and brain, as much as profound 
reflections, and that warmth or enthusiasm which 
is inseparable from them.22 
In this quote Hume seems to indicate a causal connection 
between passion and the animal spirits. 
Both of these quotes indicate that Hume believed that 
the passions were causally dependent on the state of our 
animal spirits. This is confirmed by John Wright in his 
book The Skeptical Realism of David Hume (which I have 
relied on heavily in this area) . He argues that the letter 
to the Scottish physician may hold some valuable clues 
concerning Hume's attitudes about the subject of animal 
spirits. He writes: 
Burne's own attitude to the existence and function 
of the animal spirits may have been determined by 
his own reading of Bernard de Mandeville's A 
Treatise of the Hypochondriac and Hysterick-
Diseases (1730). Mandeville's attitude to the 
theory is of particular interest because Hurne's 
analysis of his own early psychosomatic illness as 
a ~waste' of ~spirits' is based on that which is 
presented in Mandeville's book, and because 
Mandeville is cited by Burne as one of the authors 
who has introduced the experimental method of 
reasoning into English moral philosophy. 
Mandeville assumed the existence of animal spirits 
and argued from experience that those spirits 
responsible for thinking and digestion are of the 
smallest kind.23 
The historical facts mentioned make it very probable that 
Burne accepted animal spirits as a valid scientific 
hypothesis--which had been verified from experience. 
The phrase "animal spirits" was used earlier as an 
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example of terminological idiom, and this suggests a need to 
explain its significance. A Cartesian philosophy of the 
brain postulated the existence of 'animal spirits' and then 
pictured them as a kind of nervous fluid which played a 
dynamic role in changing the structures of the brain. They 
were purely physical and acted in a totally mechanical 
manner. This mechanistic perspective is clearly expressed 
in Burne's concluding remarks at the end of his book A 
Dissertation On the Passions: 
I pretend not to have here exhausted this subject. 
It is sufficient for my purpose, if I have made it 
appear, that, in the production and conduct of the 
passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, 
which is susceptible of as accurate a 
disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, 
hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy.24 
27 
These kinds of remarks strengthen my claim that Hume held to 
a full-bodied or mechanistic naturalism. 
That Hume accepted this conception of how the brain 
works may still be looked upon as insignificant unless it 
can be established that this concept was part of the 
cultural context Hume shared with his contemporaries. If 
so, then naturally they would read this into the text. This 
explains why I have underscored this one specific 
biographical belief out of the many others that could have 
been mentioned. Obviously, if Hume and his contemporaries 
held to a mechanistic Cartesian philosophy of the brain and 
if, in the Treatise, this naturalism expressed itself via 
the imagination, then by ignoring or down playing these two 
features one cannot keep from distorting what Hume was 
attempting (and interpreted by his contemporaries) to say. 
Don't Forget the Malebranche, 
Popular in His Time 
The last influence I will consider is, in many ways, 
the most decisive, not only historically, but also for 
making the connection between Burne's naturalism and the 
faculty of imagination. Nicolas Malebranche (though 
unknown to most of the English-speaking world at present) 
not only directly impacted Hume, he also popularized the 
Cartesian philosophy of the brain in Great Britain. 
Malebranche was a French priest who in 1674 had his work 
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The Search After Truth (Wherein Are Treated the Nature of 
Man's Mind and the Use He Must Make of It to Avoid Error in 
the Sciences)25 published anonymously and with this book 
obtained instant recognition. As the title suggests, 
Malebranche attempts, by an examination of the mind, to 
disclose the principal sources of human error and to teach 
us a reliable method by which we may obtain truth. 
(Evidently Descartes' Treatise of Man inspired Malebranche's 
own philosophical attempt to identify and expose the causes 
of human error.) 
Probably Descartes' mechanistic conception of the human 
body had emphasized to Malebranche the ambiguous and awkward 
position the minds of humans had within the world. As he 
puts it in his preface: 
The mind of man is by its nature situated, as it 
were, between its Creator and corporeal 
creatures,. . But as the mind-s position above 
all material things does not prevent it from being 
joined to them, and even depending in a way on a 
part of matter,. . (so) our senses, our 
imagination, and our passions are altogether 
useless for discovering the truth and our good, 
that, on the contrary, they dazzle us and seduce 
us in every instance, and generally that all the 
knowledge the mind receives through the body, or 
on account of some motion occurring in the body, 
is false and confused in relation to the objects 
it represents ... these errors are almost all 
consequences of the mind's union with the body.26 
As a theist philosopher he has a very negative attitude 
concerning the union of the mind with the body. In this 
quote he argues that almost all the errors of human 
understanding were a consequence of this union. 
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Ultimately, Malebranche hoped that by showing "that all 
the knowledge the mind receives through the body or on 
account of some motion occurring in the body, is false," 
people would turn away from these false notions to the true 
knowledge that only God gives. 
Malebranche was widely read and admired in his 
lifetime. Between 1694 and 1700, at the peak of British 
interest in Malebranche, more of his works were translated 
into English than were ever to be translated into any other 
language. Thus, it is not surprising to find that as Locke 
readied An Essay Concerning Human Understanding for its 
second edition, he contemplated the addition of a new 
chapter refuting Malebranche's vision of all things being in 
God. In light of these facts, it is not surprising to 
discover that Hume owned a copy of the third edition of 
Malebranche's Search After Truth.27 Even more pertinent is 
a letter Hume wrote, in 1737, from France to his friend 
Michael Ramsay expressing his anticipation of Ramsay's 
examination of his prepublished manuscript (what would be 
the Treatise) . To help prepare Ramsay for his manuscript, 
Hume suggest that he read: 
La Recherche de la Verite of Pere Malebranche, the 
Principles of Human Knowledge by Dr. Berkeley, 
some of the more metaphysical Articles of Bailes 
Dictionary, ... Des-Cartes Meditations would also 
be useful. These Books will make you easily 
comprehend the metaphysical parts of my Reasoning 
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. . . 
In Pere Malebranche we seem to have discovered a philosopher 
of some repute just before and during the time Hume was 
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writing his own Treatise. (The source for my material in 
this paragraph is Charles McCracken's book Malebranche and 
British Philosophy.) 
I will not discuss in detail all the ways Malebranche 
may have influenced Hume; these are ably discussed by 
McCracken. One which I will briefly discuss is 
Malebranche's rejection of the common belief in some natural 
necessity connecting events that are constantly conjoined. 
He replaced it with a psychological account of how we attain 
this belief. A noteworthy fact is Malebranche's insistence 
that the belief in 'necessary connection' is rooted in our 
faculty of imagination and is a specific expression of a 
more general tendency of our mind to: 
always blindly follow ..• the natural judgments 
of the senses, and that it is content, as it were, 
to spread itself onto the objects it considers by 
clothing them with what it has stripped from 
itself.29 
Compare this quote with a famous one found in Hume~s 
Treatise: 
Tis a common observation, that the mind has a 
great propensity to spread itself on external 
objects, and to conjoin with them any internal 
impressions, which they occasion, and which always 
make their appearance at the same time that these 
objects discover themselves to the senses.30 
There can be no doubt that Hume's account of causality draws 
heavily upon Malebranche's Search and that early in his 
section on the 'idea of necessary connection' Hume refers 
his readers to Malebranche's work. 
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Malebranche and a Mechanistic Imagination 
Did Malebranche have anything to say about imagination? 
McCracken observes: "The imagination was also a topic of 
central importance in the Search; indeed, the book on the 
imagination is longer than any other in the Search save that 
on method."31 What would Burne and his contemporaries have 
learned from Malebranche concerning the imagination? 
In these long sections concerning the imagination, Burne 
and his contemporaries would have discovered Malebranche's 
discussion of this faculty couched in psychophysiological 
terminology like this: 
We have said in the first book that our sense 
organs are composed of tiny fibers that on the one 
hand terminate in the external parts of the body 
and skin, and on the other lead toward the center 
of the brain. Now, these tiny fibers can be moved 
in two ways, either beginning with the ends in the 
brain, or with those outside. If the agitation 
originates through the impressions made by objects 
on the exterior surface of our nerve fibers and is 
communicated to the brain, then the soul senses, 
and it judges that what it senses is outside,. 
But if the internal fibers alone are lightly 
disturbed by the flow of animal spirits, .. 
Then the soul imagines, and judges that what it 
imagines is not outside, but inside the brain, 
. . . This is the difference between sensing and 
imagining.32 
Since the imagination consists only in the soul's 
power to form images of objects by imprinting 
them, so to speak, in the fibers of its brain, the 
greater and more distinct the traces of the animal 
spirits, which are the strokes of these images, 
the more strongly and distinctly the soul will 
imagine these objects. Now, just as the breadth, 
depth, and clarity of the strokes of an engraving 
depend upon the pressure applied to the burin, and 
the pliancy of the copper, so the depth and 
clarity of the traces in the imagination depend 
upon the pressure of the animal spirits, and upon 
the constitution of the brain fibers.33 
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In light of this strong mechanistic metaphor, the question 
that needs to be asked is: What kind of impression would it 
have on Hume's philosophical development? 
Is it possible that Hume may have seen more in 
Malebranche's mechanistic metaphor than just a general 
picture to be used in prompting people to turn to Divine 
truth? What if Hume saw in Malebranche's description of the 
causal connection between imagination and the animal spirits 
a good scientific explanation for a large section of our 
beliefs? Because of the theological prejudices which 
existed at the time, Hume may have used Malebranche's 
descriptive terms without making explicit the mechanistic 
model which undergirded them. In other words, the best 
scientific explanation for Hume's principles of association 
or the "secret tie or union among our ideas" was a Cartesian 
philosophy of the brain. 
Is there any evidence for this in Malebranche's book 
Search After Truth? A few quotes are certainly suggestive. 
the most ordinary cause of the confusion and 
falsity of our ideas. For the animal spirits that 
were directed by the action of external objects, 
or even by orders of the soul, to produce certain 
traces in the brain often produce others that 
truly resemble them in some things, but that are 
not quite the same objects, ... because the 
animal spirits, finding some resistance in the 
parts of the brain whence they should pass, and 
being easily detoured crowd into the deep traces 
of the ideas that are more familiar to us.34 
In this quote Malebranche is trying to explain the 
occurrence of errors of resemblance by tracing them to a 
causal glitch in the underlying mechanistic philosophy of 
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the brain. Immediately following this quote Malebranche 
gives some examples to illustrate his point. In these 
examples Malebranche discusses how the animal spirits, in 
finding some resistance, detour. into traces that are more 
familiar and yet still resemble the previous impression in 
some fashion. 
Elsewhere he describes in terms of brain traces how an 
idea will call up another if both have been frequently or 
regularly conjoined in our previous experience: 
This connection consists in the fact that the 
brain traces are so well tied to one another that 
none can be aroused without all those which were 
imprinted at the same time being aroused. . . Now 
the mutual connection of the traces and 
consequently of the ideas with one another is not 
only the basis for all rhetorical figures but also 
for an infinity of other things of greater 
importance in morality, politics, and generally in 
all the sciences having some relation to man, and 
consequently to many things of which I shall speak 
in the sequel.35 
This passage is strikingly similar to the description Hume 
gives of contiguity on page eleven of the Treatise: 
'Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in 
changing their objects, are necessitated to change 
them regularly, and take them as they lie 
contiguous to each other, the imagination must by 
long custom acquire the same method of thinking, 
and run along the parts of space and time in 
conceiving its objects. 
Another noteworthy similarity from the previous quote is the 
way Malebranche asserts that "connection of the traces and 
consequently of the ideas" has the potential for becoming 
the basis for all the sciences. This sounds remarkably like 
Hume's later claim, in the introduction of the Treatise, 
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that "all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to 
human nature."36 
Could Burne have actually found within Malebranche's 
Search some material which would have suggested the 
fruitfulness of developing a 'methodological naturalism'? 
To substantiate this I will examine a set of judgments that 
Malebranche viewed as wholly independent of our wills, which 
he called 'natural judgments'. 
Transforming Natural Judgements 
into Natural Law 
Malebranche admits that he "speaks of sensations as 
natural judgments, because this way of speaking makes sense 
of certain things."37 What things did it make sense of? 
Theologically speaking, Malebranche believed that the "mind 
was made only for God." However, this creates a problem 
since we are not just a 'Cartesian mind' but an embodied 
mind that seems interfaced with a particular body. Thus: 
Being composed of a mind and a body, we have two 
kinds of goods to look for, those of the mind and 
those of the body. The goods of the body do 
not deserve the attention of a mind, which God 
made only for Him. The mind, then, must recognize 
this sort of good without examination, and. 
since God does not will that we attend to them, He 
leads us to these things only by instinct, i.e., 
by pleasant or unpleasant sensations (emphasis 
mine) ,38 
Here, Malebranche distinguishes between two modes of 
cognition. The former is characterized by a self-conscious 
mental awareness, but the latter is 'instinctive' and thus 
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not a cognitive mode one is fully in control of, or totally 
conscious of. 
But this was not the only reason that Malebranche had 
for believing in these 'natural judgments'; he also had what 
we would call a scientific reason for believing in this 
unique set of judgments: 
I feel I must again warn that judgments about 
the distance, size, and so on, of objects are 
formed in the ways I have just explained, not by 
the soul, but by God according to the laws 
concerning the union of the soul and body. I have 
therefore called these sorts of judgments natural 
in order to emphasize that they occur in us 
independently of us, and even in spite of us. 
I attribute to the soul the performance of 
judgments and inferences as well as the subsequent 
production of its sensations, which can be the 
effect only of an infinite power and intelligence. 
As soon as we open our eyes, God alone can inform 
us instantaneously of the size, figure, motion,and 
color of objects surrounding us.39 
It seems to me that Malebranche would argue that only an 
'infinite power and intelligence' can make sense of the 
complex facts the new science of optics had discovered 
concerning our perceptual capacities. These "compound 
sensations"40 which involve an "infinity of instantaneous 
inferences which vary with each movement of our eyes"41 are 
the result of God acting in us in "consequence of the same 
laws."42 
Repeatedly Malebranche refers to the "laws concerning 
the union of the soul and body" (emphasis mine). This idea 
of existing laws which regulate the frontier between soul 
and body certainly makes room for a "science of Man" as 
attempted later by Burne. That Malebranche considered this 
claim to be scientific may be suggested by the claim he 
makes later in his Elucidations when he defends these laws 
by appealing to the principle of simplicity: 
Since order would have it that the laws 
concerning the union of body and soul should be 
very simple, they must be very general; and God 
ought not to have established particular laws for 
cases that hardly ever occur. But the senses 
are determined toward certain natural judgments 
that are the most useful that can be conceived of, 
as I have shown in the first book. Nonetheless, 
these judgments sometimes deceive us, because it 
is impossible that it should be otherwise without 
multiplying the very simple laws concerning the 
union of body and soul.43 
In this quote Malebranche is arguing that God is committed 
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to creating only a few simple and very general laws by which 
to regulate the union of body and soul. I want to emphasize 
the scientific status Malebranche believed these natural 
judgments held because this could have suggested to Hume the 
fruitfulness of attempting to discover the "principles of 
human nature." 
Malebranche's manner of expressing his position on 
natural judgments may have inadvertently presented Hume with 
a choice. The potential for a misinterpretation can be 
clearly seen in this paragraph: 
There are three very important causes of the 
connection of ideas with traces. The first, and 
the one the other presuppose, is nature, or the 
constant and immutable will of the Creator. There 
is, for example, a natural connection, independent 
of our will, between the traces producing a tree 
or a mountain we see and the ideas of tree or 
mountain,. 44 
It seems likely when Malebranche wrote this he intended the 
disjunction between nature or the Creator to be one of 
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identity. In other words, from Malebranche's perspective 
(Occasionalism) nature is another name for the Creator. 
However, it can be read in a manner that presents the reader 
with a logical disjunction, either nature or the Creator. 
If read this way then the reader is presented with a choice: 
Either nature or the Creator is presupposed to explain the 
connection between our ideas and brain traces. I believe 
that Hume chose the former and, in typical Humean fashion, 
later used some of Malebranche's own principles against the 
overall position Malebranche was trying to establish. 
The important reversal Hume makes in opposition to 
Malebranche concerns the latter's value judgment in regard 
to the union of the mind with the body. What conclusions 
did this Catholic priest draw from these observations on the 
dependence of our senses and imagination on the body? 
This is how all the thoughts we have as a result 
of our dependence upon our bodies are completely 
false, and the more dangerous for our soul as they 
are useful to our bodies. 
Therefore, let us try to deliver ourselves 
gradually from the illusions of our senses, from 
the visions of our imaginations,. . Let us 
carefully reject all the confused ideas we have as 
a result of our dependence upon our bodies, and 
only admit the clear and evident ideas the mind 
receives through the union it necessarily has with 
the divine Word, or with eternal truth and 
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Where Malebranche counsels us to reject and seek deliverance 
from the confused ideas which are a product of the mind's 
union with the body, Hume believes that this dependence upon 
nature is what saves us from skepticism. 
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Locke's Logical Point 
Since Malebranche lived and wrote before the time of 
Burne and his contemporaries, I need to establish that Burne's 
contemporaries were concerned and interested in naturalism. 
Let me now attempt to establish my claim that a naturalistic 
conception of human understanding was at the time a well-
known and hotly debated topic. The controversy begins with, 
of all people, the illustrious theist philosopher John Locke 
and centered on a suggestion he made in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. In book four his topic of discussion 
is knowledge and opinion, and in chapter three he focuses on 
the extent and limits of human knowledge. One example, of 
the limitations of human knowledge, which he discusses is 
the relationship between matter and thinking. 
We have the ideas of matter and Thinking, but 
possibly shall never be able to know, whether any 
mere material Being thinks, or no; it being 
impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own 
Ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether 
Omnipotency had not given to some Systems of 
Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and 
think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so 
disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance: it 
being, in respect of our Notions, not much more 
remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that 
GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter a 
Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd 
to it another Substance, with Faculty of Thinking; 
since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor 
to what sort of Substance the Almighty has been 
pleased to give that Power, which cannot be in any 
created Being, but merely by the good pleasure and 
Bounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction 
in it, that the first eternal thinking Being 
should, if he pleased, give to certain Systems of 
created senseless matter, put together as he 
thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and 
thought:46 
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In this passage Locke is making the logical point that since 
it is not contradictory an all-powerful God may have "given 
to some System of Matter" the capacity of thought, instead 
of uniting "a thinking immaterial Substance" to it (the 
traditional conception) . 
In his book Thinking Matter (Materialism in Eighteenth-
Century Britain), John Yelton documents how this "suggestion 
echoed down the years of the eighteenth century, attacked 
here, cited there, reinforced and expanded towards the end 
of the century."47 Locke's suggestion provoked this 
outpouring because the religiously orthodox felt that the 
acceptance of this idea would be used as a weapon by those 
who were interested in undermining traditional religion. 
Yelton identifies three discernible strands in the 
development of materialism in Britain: 
Locke's suggestion of thinking matter; Collin's 
insistence that organized masses of matter can 
have properties that none of the individual parts 
has; and the change in the scientific concept of 
matter, from passive corpuscles to active forces. 
Reaction to the first two of these strands 
frequently involved the fear that man would be 
viewed as a machine, as a piece of clockwork. 
Closely related was the debate over animals: do 
they reason or are they machines?48 
I am not going to repeat the documentation Yelton provides 
since, for my purposes, it is enough to establish that 
materialism was a topic of widespread interest and one which 
we should expect Hume to address in the Treatise. 
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Hume Sharpens the Point 
He discusses this very issue in the section titled 'Of 
the Immateriality of the Soul', and the conclusion he 
arrives at will, I believe, reinforce that Hume accepted a 
Cartesian philosophy of the brain. Hume begins by 
discussing an argument he believes few have been able to 
withstand: 
"Matter and motion, 'tis commonly said in 
schools, however vary'd, are still matter and 
motion, and produce only a difference in the 
position and situation of objects. Divide a body 
as often as you please, 'tis still body. Place it 
in any figure, nothing ever results but figure, or 
the relation of parts. Move it in any manner, you 
still find motion or a change of relation.49 
He believes that a connection exists between this subject 
and what has been previously discovered about the causal 
relation: 
that we are never sensible of any connexion 
betwixt causes and effects, and that 'tis only by 
our experience of thei~ constant conjunction, we 
can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. 
I have inferr'd from these principles, that to 
consider the matter a priori, any thing may 
produce any thing, and that we shall never 
discover a reason, why any object may or may not 
be the cause of any, however great, or however 
little the resemblance may be betwixt them ... 
For tho' there appear no manner of connexion 
betwixt motion or thought, the case is the same 
with all other causes and effects.SO 
Hume does not just deny that it is "impossible motion can 
ever produce thought, or a different position of parts give 
rise to a different passion or reflection;"Sl he affirms 
that not only is it? 
possible we may have such an experience but 'tis 
certain we have it; since every one may perceive, 
that the different dispositions of his body change 
his thoughts and sentiments. I wou'd answer, 
that we must separate the question concerning the 
substance of the mind from that concerning the 
cause of its thought; and that confining ourselves 
to the latter question we find by the comparing 
their ideas, that thought and motion are different 
from each other, and by experience, that they are 
constantly united; which being all the 
circumstances, that enter into the idea of cause 
and effect, when apply'd to the operations of 
matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may 
be, and actually is, the cause of thought and 
perception. 52 
To pronounce, then, the final decision upon 
the whole; ... the constant conjunction of 
objects constitutes the very essence of cause and 
effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as 
the causes of thought, as far as we have any 
notion of that relation.53 
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In this quote, Burne uses his methodological naturalism as a 
razor to distinguish "the question concerning the substance 
of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought." 
He suggests that we confine ourselves to the latter question 
which can be answered by a scientific approach. If we 
accept this methodological limitation, then Burne believes it 
supports the claim that "as far as we have any notion" 
concerning the essence of the casual relation then "matter 
and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought." 
A Mechanistic Imagination 
It will prove simple to move from the general claim 
concerning "thinking matter" to the more specific claim 
concerning a Cartesian conception of imagination. John 
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Wright, who has done work trying to establish the meaning of 
'imagination' at the time Hume wrote, reports that: 
When contemporaries of Hume opened up their copy 
of Chambers' Cyclopaedia--a standard scientific 
reference book of the day--to the entry 
'Imagination' they read the following definition: 
A Power or Faculty of the Soul, by which 
it conceives, and forms Ideas of Things, 
by means of certain Traces and 
Impressions that had been before made in 
the Fibres of the Brain by Sensation. 
The theory of imagination presented by Chambers 
was the standard account of this faculty accepted 
by most philosophers in the first half of the 
eighteenth century. . . There is every reason to 
think that the discussion of impressions and ideas 
in the opening pages of the Treatise would have 
been understood by Burne and his readers in the 
context of the basic theory laid down by 
Chambers.54 
I consider this quote from Wright to be the concluding 
capstone confirming my claims that Hume needs to be read in 
terms of a mechanistic conception of imagination. 
Wright discusses another point of interest concerning 
the entry on imagination in Chambers' Cyclopedia. It has to 
do with the citation which Chambers offers as the source for 
his views on imagination. 
At the end of his entry Chambers writes: 'See 
Father Malebranch Recher. de la Verite, lib.2'. 
In fact, most of Chambers' entry is simply a loose 
translation of passages in the opening chapter of 
Book II of Malebranche's Recherche.SS 
It would seem that Kemp-Smith's thesis that Hutcheson was 
the primary influence on Burne's naturalism may be only 
partially correct. The evidence marshalled in this paper 
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indicates that Malebranche influenced not only Hume, but 
also his contemporaries. 
If this is true, then we can explain why imagination 
came to play such a significant role inHume's philosophy. 
Reading Malebranche may have suggested to Hume (contrary to 
Malebranche's original intention) the fruitfulness of 
developing a methodological naturalism. As Hume described 
it: 
Our present business, then, must be to find some 
natural production, where the operation and 
efficacy of a cause can be clearly conceiv'd and 
comprehended by the mind, without any danger of 
obscurity or mistake.56 
Hume wanted to limit the kinds of questions we asked about 
human understanding to their natural causes. 
In proposing this methodological dictum Hume may have 
hoped to reorient our investigation into human understanding 
from the traditional emphasis on substance to an emphasis on 
causes. A by-product of the new orientation would be the 
possibility of describing the manner in which these causes 
produced our thoughts and passions. It was the descriptive 
element of his task which allowed imagination to rise to a 
place of prominence in our epistemic experience. 
Nevertheless, Malebranche pointed the way even in this 
aspect of Hume's task. 
Summarizing the New Picture 
Before attempting a new reading of the Treatise, I 
would like to summarize the previous points. Acting out of 
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my hermeneutical convictions, I began to situate Hume and 
his writings within the historical context out of which they 
arose. This period was characterized by a tension between 
the older religious worldview and the emerging scientific 
worldview. One topic of intense interest and debate 
centered on the different conceptions of what it meant to be 
human. Just how far could one go in using matter in motion, 
the fundamental concepts of the scientific worldview, to 
explain human nature? Thus, Hume's title A Treatise of 
Human Nature: Being An Attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. 
Hume wants to use a methodological naturalism as a new 
foundation upon which "to explain the principles of human 
nature."57 These ''laws concerning the union of the soul and 
body" were the expression of "a certain regular mechanism" 
and thus a part of natural philosophy. Hume's 
methodological naturalism implied that the statement "motion 
may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and 
perception," was the most acceptable scientific hypothesis 
at the time. Even though Hume may have adopted a Cartesian 
philosophy of the brain early in his life, its explanatory 
powers may not have been apparent to him, until he read 
Malebranche. This is certainly speculation on my part, and 
nothing substantial in this paper hinges on this; 
nevertheless, Hume did embark on a program to see how far 
one could go in discovering some natural production for 
explaining why we hold the beliefs we do and think the way 
we do. 
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From Malebranche he already had lessons on how the 
imagination "spread itself onto the objects it considers by 
clothing them with what it has stripped from itself" and 
thus played a subtle and unnoticed role in creating some of 
our most fundamental beliefs, like cause and effect. By 
combining these two elements Hume could develop a consistent 
system of thought in which our most fundamental beliefs were 
grounded in a mechanistic conception of human nature and 
thus forced on us "even against our will." Though 
rationally unjustified they were nonetheless unavoidably 
required by the laws of nature which expressed this 
necessity through the spontaneous creations of a 
mechanistically controlled imagination. 
CHAPTER IV 
A NEW VISION OF DAVID HUME 
Making My Points Count 
My reading of the Treatise is informed by this vision 
of Burne's task. Thus, I compare him to a scientist who is 
developing a promising research program. I will see his 
Treatise as a documentation of his attempts to deepen and 
develop Malebranche's idea of "laws concerning the union of 
the soul and body," particularly as it applies to our 
cognitive experiences. It is Burne's positive attitude 
concerning these laws and his attempt not only to identify 
them (principle of association) , but show their explanatory 
power, which distinguishes him as an 'inventor'. His 
attempt at revolutionary science could be compared to a 
Newton or Darwin. 
By situating the revolutionary character.of what Burne 
was attempting within the theological prejudices some of his 
contemporaries held, we have sought to show how the 
traditional reading originated. It is because Burne is 
attempting to broaden the boundaries of science that he 
comes into conflict with the theological prejudices of some 
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of his contemporaries (recall the theologically motivated 
conclusions Malebranche drew from his investigation) . Since 
the revolutionary character of his endeavor involves him in 
all the problems any innovator faces, my paper will not 
attempt to clearly articulate Hume's theory of imagination. 
Any attempt to do so flies in the face of one important 
fact--Hume did not intend to do this. He was attempting to 
develop a scientific conception of human nature. 
Instead my reading will focus on the tension between 
the presuppositions Hume and his contemporaries already 
shared about human understanding, and his attempts to break 
out of this inherited set of beliefs and say something new. 
By seeking to make a fundamental shift in the way we view 
human understanding, Hume commits himself to a violation of 
existing beliefs and conceptions. My reading will seek to 
identify those old words which he must use in new ways if he 
is to accomplish the task he has taken on. If we encounter 
confusion and obscurity, this will not surprise us; it 
should warn us that at this point Hume may be trying to say 
something very significant. 
In the following paragraphs I will structure the paper 
in three parts: 
1. Hume's discussion of imagination as motivated by 
his empiricist presuppositions. 
2. His ad hoc discussion of imagination in terms of 
its role in producing the concept of causality. 
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3. A discussion of the role imagination plays in 
producing basic beliefs like personal identity and 
the existence of external objects. 
The reader should keep in mind the background 
information previously given (in the earlier sections of 
this paper) as he works through these three sections. If he 
does this, then hopefully a new pictur~ of Hume and his 
philosophy will begin to develop. 
Science, Hume, and His Reader 
It is obvious from what has already been presented that 
I do not buy into the traditional scenario which presents 
Hume as the one who works to reveal the skeptical 
conclusions which are hidden in the first principles of an 
empiricist philosophy. I would suggest that Hume adopted as 
a working assumption, 11 the general proposition, That all our 
simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from 
simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and 
which they exactly represent,"58 because it seems to 
represent a philosophical expression of science as he 
understood it. 
Furthermore, I seriously doubt the candor of his 
confessional style and tend to view it as a literary device 
he uses to help engage the interest of his reader. This 
intuition is further strengthened by the fact -that in an age 
in which science is rapidly establishing itself as a 
reliable source of knowledge, the first stubborn piece of 
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data, resisting an empiricist explanation, is the concept of 
causation. This paradox would certainly be worthy of a 
reader's pursuit: the fundamental concept of science is 
itself unscientific--not grounded in experience! 
What should he (Hume and his reader) do? Should they 
allow this apparent anomaly to overpower the first principle 
of a scientific philosophy? It seems that he wants his 
readers to be aware of this conflict since he asks just this 
question: 
Shall the despair of success make me assert, 
that I am here possest of an idea, which is not 
preceded by any similar impression? This wou'd be 
too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy; 
since the contrary principle has been· already so 
firmly establish'd as to admit of no farther 
doubt; at least, till we have more fully examin'd 
the present difficulty.59 
The solving of this puzzle would certainly have been of 
interest to any armchair sleuth of the sciences. 
In support of Hume's decision to press on, most 
philosophers of science realize that any beginning research 
program must ignore apparent problems in pursuit of deeper 
solutions or hope that a later discovery may justify the 
original approach while uncovering material which explains 
why the present apparent anomaly is in reality a pseudo-
problem. 
It is not clear to me that anyone should fault Hume for 
maintaining his commitment, in the face of conflicting 
evidence, to what he considered an established principle. 
Thus, he chooses to continue to develop the implications of 
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his empiricist position, though he does, for the moment, 
abandon its systematic development. Here is how he 
describes his present situation and the impact it has on the 
way he plans to proceed: 
We must, therefore, proceed like those, who 
being in search of anything, that lies conceal'd 
from them, and not finding it in the place they 
expected, beat about all the neighboring fields, 
without any certain view or design, in hopes their 
good fortune will at last guide them to what they 
search for. 'Tis necessary for us to leave the 
direct survey of this question concerning the 
nature of that necessary connexion, which enters 
into our idea of cause and endeavour to find some 
other questions, the examination of which will 
perhaps afford a hint, that may serve to clear up 
the present difficulty. ·60 
Is this confession of confused belief any different from a 
scientist who is confronted by the need to account for some 
unexpected phenomenon in terms of his previous conceptual 
scheme? Could not Kepler have said this to himself as he 
worked at trying to bring order to what appeared to be 
nothing but random numbers? 
Since his readers share the same historical horizon, it 
would seem reasonable to them that an ad hoc investigation 
was better than abandoning the scientific style of 
philosophizing. As Hume's readers we are committed to 
following him in his ad hoc attempt to discover an 
impression from which we derive the idea of necessary 
connection as implied by the phrase 'cause and effect.' But 
here I am getting ahead of myself if we want to investigate 
the role imagination plays in the philosophy of Hume. 
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Working the Empiricist Tradition 
In the opening sections of part one, Hume's discussion 
of imagination is informed by the standard empiricist 
scenario. Thus, he begins his discussion of human 
understanding by repeating the standard empiricist 
distinction between impressions and ideas. This distinction 
"consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which 
they strike upon the mind."6l 
Almost immediately he clarifies the relation that 
exists between them: simple ideas are derived from simple 
impressions. Next he divides impressions into two kinds: 
"those of sensation and those of reflexion.••62 The latter 
are "derived in a great measure from our ideas"63 and 
represent faint copies of previous impressions. The 
introduction of the term 'copy' naturally leads into a 
discussion of the faculties commonly associated with copying 
and picturing: memory and imagination. 
Hume originally attempts to distinguish these two 
faculties in terms of the force or vivacity which 
accompanies the reappearance of the idea: memory retains a 
considerable degree of the original impression's vivacity, 
while imagination has entirely lost this element of 
vivacity. He then attempts a second distinction in terms of 
the freedom which each faculty has in regard to the original 
order of the impressions. Thus, "imagination is not 
restrain'd to the same order and form with the original 
impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty'd down in 
that respect, without any power of variation."64 He 
transforms the former's lack of restraint into a positive 
trait, characteristic of the imagination's? 
liberty . . to transpose and change its ideas 
Where-ever the imagination perceives a 
difference among ideas, it can easily produce a 
separation.65 
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Burne immediately admits that the liberty of the imagination 
would make the operations of that faculty unaccountable 
"were it not guided by some universal principles which 
render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times 
and places."66 
He describes this universal principle as "some 
associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces 
another."67 There are three qualities: resemblance, 
contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect--with 
causality being not only the most extensive but also 
creating the strongest connection. Burne's summary of these 
principles of union is very suggestive: 
These are therefore the principles of union or 
cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the 
imagination supply the place of that inseparable 
connexion, by which they are united in our memory. 
Here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental 
world will be found to have as extra-ordinary 
effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in 
as many and as various forms its effects are every 
where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are 
mostly unknown, and must be resolv'd into original 
qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to 
explain.68 
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We know from our previous discussion of Malebranche that 
Hume was aware that his three qualities of association could 
be explained in terms of a mechanistic conception of 
imagination. By building an analogy between gravity and his 
association of ideas, Hume may have been hinting that he 
believed that these principles of union expressed a kind of 
natural law or mechanical regularity. 
In these sections imagination is pictured as dependent 
upon both kinds of impressions: sensation and reflection. 
This expresses the influence of Hume's empiricist 
presuppositions which naturally place emphasis on the 
importance of our sensory impressions. Hume's order of 
exposition is here probably a good indicator of the kind of 
hierarchy his empiricist heritage would have established 
concerning the various faculties which comprised human 
understanding: sensations, reflection, memory, and 
imagination. Notice how Hume, by closely identifying the 
imagination with the principle of association and by 
extravagantly praising the latter, is subtly calling into 
question these empiricist evaluations. 
Most of the comments in this early section really are 
not that exceptional, but it is important to keep in mind 
that this reflects Hume's empiricist presupposition. All of 
this will change if, as mentioned earlier in the paper, we 
pick up Hume's investigation where he had suspended any 
attempt to systematically develop his empiricist 
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methodology, and sets out ad hoc in an attempt to discover 
the impression from which we derive an idea of necessary 
connection. I have arbitrarily designated this looser style 
of continuing as the second phase of Hume's investigation 
into human understanding. 
How Necessary Connection Causes a Break 
As we have previously seen, Hume is unable to identify 
the impression from which our idea of necessary connection 
is derived. But, Hume asks: 
Shall we then rest contented with these two 
relations of contiguity and succession, as 
affording a compleat idea of causation? By no 
means. An object may be contiguous and prior to 
another, without being consider'd as its cause. 
There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into 
consideration; and that relation is of much 
greater importance, than any of the other two 
above-mention'd.69 
With these remarks Hume has made the idea of causality stand 
or fall dependent upon his finding an impression from which 
we derive the idea of necessary connection. 
Hume seems to realize that the idea of causality is so 
significant that if he is unable to find an impression from 
which it is derived, he may have to reject the very first 
principle of his empiricist philosophy. Maybe it is because 
he realizes that, in the eyes of most, this counter-example 
proves the falsity of his system that he decides to abandon 
a systematic development of an empiricist conception of 
human understanding--opting to proceed ad hoc "in hopes 
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their good fortune will at last guide them to what they 
search for." This shift to an ad hoc method occurs on page 
seventy-eight, and not until page one hundred sixty-four has 
he successfully identified the impression from which we 
derive the idea of necessary connection. 
Within these almost hundred pages imagination will 
replace memory within the previously identified empiricist 
hierarchy. It is this reversal of position within the 
empiricist hierarchy that I will be interested in 
highlighting in the following paragraphs. 
In the beginning of this ad hoc search Burne maintains a 
standard empiricist line asserting that in all reasonings 
from causes or effects there must be: 
some mixture of impressions, or at least of ideas 
of the memory, which are equivalent to 
impressions. When we infer effects from causes, 
we must establish the existence of these causes; 
which we have only two ways of doing, either by an 
immediate perception of our memory or senses . 
without the authority either of the memory or 
senses our whole reasoning wou'd be chimerical and 
without foundation. 70 
This new emphasis on memory may express Burne's intuition 
that past experiences or memories must play some kind of 
role in our causal reasoning. 
Imagination's Emergence in an 
Ad Hoc Methodology 
Whatever the reason, whether it was this new emphasis 
on memory or the unexpected problems besetting his 
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investigation, Burne felt a need to reexamine the foundations 
upon which his previous distinctions between memory and 
imagination had rested. This time he rejected the previous 
distinction based upon memory's commitment to preserving the 
original order of the impressions, arguing that it was 
"impossible to recall the past impressions, in order to 
compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their 
arrangement be exactly sirnilar."71 Of course, the only 
distinction left was the one based on memory's "superior 
force and vivacity" which contrasted with imagination's 
"fainter and more obscure" ideas. 
All this is old hat until Burne immediately proceeds to 
obliterate this distinction through a new set of 
observations: 
We are frequently in doubt concerning the ideas of 
the memory, as they become very weak and feeble; 
and are at a loss to determine whether any image 
proceeds from the fancy or the memory, when it is 
not drawn in such lively colours as distinguish 
that latter faculty. I think, I remember such an 
event, says one; but am not sure. A long tract of 
time has almost worn it out of my memory, and 
leaves me uncertain whether or not it be the pure 
offspring of my fancy. 72 
In the next paragraph he shows how ideas of the imagination 
"may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an 
idea of the memory." Then without blinking an eye Burne re-
affirms the distinction he has just offered counter-examples 
to. 
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What is going on here? I believe that this is a 
textual mark signaling the beginning of the end for memory 
as a potential source from which the idea of necessary 
connection arises. A few pages later Hume explicitly argues 
for this: 
As our senses shew us in one instance two bodies, 
or motions, or qualities in certain relations of 
succession and contiguity; so our memory presents 
us only with a multitude of instances, wherein we 
always find like bodies, motions, or qualities in 
like relations. From the mere repetition of any 
past impression, even to infinity, there never 
will arise any new original idea, such as that of 
a necessary connexion; and the number of 
impressions has in this case no more effect than 
if we confin'd ourselves to one only.73 
Basically Hume is arguing that if we did not find the idea 
for necessary connection in any one sense impression then 
why do we think that memory can solve our dilemma when all 
it can offer is a multitude of past sense impressions. Once 
again Hume's empiricist presupposition lead him to a dead 
end. 
However, Hume wants to turn this negative conclusion 
into a positive clue, since during this time he discovered 
that after "the constant conjunction of any objects, we 
always drew an inference from one object to another."74 He 
wonders if the idea of necessary connection "depends on the 
inference, instead of the inference's depending on the 
necessary connexion."75 This is a strategic question for 
Hume to ask since it encourages his reader to consider this 
subject in terms of how, in fact, humans think. If the idea 
of necessary connection depends on the inference, then the 
next question becomes: How does this inference get 
produced? Or, as Hume frames it: 
Whether experience produces the idea by means of 
the understanding or of the imagination; whether 
we are determin'd by reason to make the 
transition, or by a certain association and 
relation of perceptions.76 
Hume believes that if reason produces this transition it 
must proceed upon the principle: 
that instances, of which we have had no 
experience, must resemble instances, of which we 
have had experience, and that the course of nature 
continues always uniformly the same.77 
Furthermore, this principle can be understood as an 
expression of knowledge or probabilities. If it is an 
expression of the former, then our ability to imagine a 
change in the course of nature reveals that it is not an 
absolute impossibility, and this alone refutes "any 
pretended demonstration against it."78 
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Against the latter, Hume argues that probability itself 
is: 
founded on the presumption of a resemblance 
betwixt those objects, of which we have had 
experience, and those, of which we have had none; 
and therefore 'tis impossible this presumption can 
arise from probability. The same principle cannot 
.be both the cause and effect of another; and this 
is, perhaps, the only proposition concerning that 
relation, which is either intuitively or 
demonstratively certain. 79 
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At this point Hume has shown that the causal inference is 
not derived from either the impressions of the senses or 
memory, nor from demonstrative or probable reasoning thus, 
by default, imagination is left. 
Imagination and Its Associates 
That the faculty of imagination is alone left, as a 
possibility for producing this inference, should not lead 
one to think that it acts alone in bringing about this 
·inference. Some commentators point to a passage in the 
Appendix in which Hume asserts that "it is impossible, that 
that faculty (imagination) can ever, of itself, reach 
belief"BO as evidence against any claims that imagination 
plays an important role inHume's philosophy. But this 
passage is not incompatible with the view I believe Hume was 
trying to develop. 
Furthermore, this confusion was not created by Hume. 
He expressed himself clearly when making the transition from 
reason, as the possible source of causal reasoning, to 
imagination, as its actual source. 
We have already taken notice of certain relations, 
which make us pass from one object to another, 
even tho' there be no reason to determine us to 
that transition; and this we may establish for a 
general rule, that wherever the mind constantly 
and uniformly makes a transition without any 
reason, it is influenc'd by these relations. Now 
this is exactly the present case . . • the mind is 
not determin'd by reason, but by certain 
principles, which associate together the ideas of 
these objects1 and unite them in the imagination.B 
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These relations have already been mentioned in the opening 
sections of the Treatise where their ability to unite ideas 
was compared with the ability of gravity to unite objects. 
It is these relations which "associate together the ideas of 
these object, and unite them in the imagination." 
The imagination "of itself" or "alone" does not ever 
produce an idea that has the same kind of forceful or 
vivacious feeling which characterizes causal reasoning. 
This is an important point to remember since Burne identifies 
as one of his hypotheses: "that all belief arises from the 
association of ideas."82 Thus, contrary to Kemp-Smith and 
others, Burne's is not only a philosophy of belief, it is 
also an investigation into the causal sources of our 
beliefs. With this clarification behind us we shall return 
to Burne's search for the impression from which the idea of 
necessary connection is derived. 
In this paragraph there are two points I wish to 
highlight in Burne's continuing efforts to discover the 
source of our idea of necessary connection. First I want to 
bring out the way he clarifies and strengthens the 
difference between imagination and memory. Using an 
interesting example Hume argues that our use of words 
provides a case in which: 
it is not absolutely necessary, that upon hearing 
such a particular sound, we shou'd reflect on any 
past experience, and consider what idea has been 
usually connected with sound. The imagination of 
itself supplies the place of this reflection, and 
is so accustom'd to pass from the word to the 
idea, that it interposes not a moment's delay 
betwixt the hearing of the one, and the conception 
of the other.83 
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Notice that in the quote one could possibly accuse Hume of 
contradicting the passage found in the Appendix. However in 
this case, Hume is not using the phrase "of itself" to 
indicate that imagination by itself, without any help, 
produces this causal relation. If the remark is placed in 
its larger context, it seems fairly clear that he is using 
these words to indicate the faculty through which the 
associating principles work. (This also explains a 
reference which occurs a few pages later in which Hume 
writes "that this belief, I say, arises immediately, without 
any new operation of the reason or imagination.") 
Imagination is not the original source of this 
impression but only the faculty through which it is 
expressed. It is this idea of origins which is the key to 
reconciling the insufficiency of the imagination to produce 
"of itself'' an impression of such vivacity as Hume pictures 
characterizing the phenomena called belief, and the forceful 
impressions which result from these associating principles 
uniting ideas in the imagination. The ideas which 
originated nonmechanistically out of the imagination we 
might call fantasies or creative hypotheses: and these 
characteristically have less force and vivacity. (It was 
this conception of imagination as daydreaming or a fiction 
which is a product of my will that I had read, and most 
modern readers probably do read into Hume's Treatise.) 
Distinct from these are those ideas which result from 
the principle of association using the imagination to 
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produce a set of ideas characterized by a force and vivacity 
which Burne calls belief. Burne uses this interaction of 
imagination and the principles of association to make a 
positive distinction between memory and imagination. This 
line of interpretation is verified by Burne's example of the 
man who on a journey stops before a river, knowing that if 
he continues he will sink. Burne observes: 
But can we think, that on this occasion he 
reflects on any past experience, and calls to 
remembrance instances, that he has seen or heard 
of, in order to discover the effects of water on 
animal bodies? No surely; this is not the method 
in which he proceeds in his reasoning. The idea 
of sinking is so closely connected with that of 
water, and the idea of suffocating with that of 
sinking, that the mind makes the transition 
without the assistance of the memory. The custom 
operates before we have time for reflexion.84 
Netic~ how this causal transition occurs "without the 
assistance of the memory." On first reading this statement 
it is counter-intuitive: Is not causal reasoning based on 
past experiences? How has custom established this autonomy 
from memory, and in the process created this positive 
relationship with imagination? Also, in this example the 
ideas of imagination are certainly lively and vivacious 
contra Burne's original distinction between imagination and 
memory based on the latter's greater vivacity. 
Once again we discover that imagination does not work 
alone in producing the causal inference, but in this case 
Burne attributes the initial impulse to custom. In previous 
discussions concerning the original source of human causal 
reasoning, Burne had identified it as the principle of 
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association. Now we see that Hume's description of causal 
reasoning exhibits an ambiguity. Even though in both cases 
imagination does not act alone, it is not clear whether it 
is the principle of association or custom which acts through 
imagination in creating the causal inference. What is the 
relationship between the principle of association and 
custom? 
Association and Custom: An Ambiguity 
As we begin this investigation into the relationship 
between the principle of association and custom it would be 
good to remind the reader of what was written earlier in 
regard to custom. The word custom had a different meaning 
for Hume and his contemporaries than it has for us today: 
remember my discussion of Locke's conception of custom? 
This mechanistic conception of custom is hinted at in the 
beginning of the section out of which this quote was 
obtained: appropriately enough it is titled "Of the causes 
of belief." In the opening paragraphs Hume makes reference 
to animal spirits and what he calls "a natural transition of 
the disposition,"85 while a little later he suggests that 
the whole affair may be put in a fuller light by being 
considered "as a question in natural philosophy.n86 
When, after his river example, Hume claims that "we 
must necessarily acknowledge, that experience may produce a 
belief and a judgement of causes and effects by a secret 
operation, and without being once thought of,"s7 would he 
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have identified this secret (unconscious) operation with a 
mechanistic conception of human nature? If Hume held to a 
mechanistic conception of custom and the principle of 
association, then how did he conceive of these two 
interacting? Did these two words indicate the same thing 
for Hume? Or did they stand for something different which 
nevertheless interacted? In both cases, was he trying to 
use them to say new things? 
Let us pu~sue this thought through examining what kind 
of relationship obtains between custom, imagination, and 
belief. In the previous quote we have discovered that 
custom, like the principle of association, can produce 
belief via the imagination. In a section of the Treatise 
entitled "Of the reason of animals," he hints at the kind of 
relationship he believes obtains. 
Now let any philosopher make a trial, and 
endeavour to explain that act of the mind, which 
we call belief, and give an account of the 
principles, from which it is deriv'd, independent 
of the influence of custom on the imagination, and 
let his hypothesis be equally applicable to beasts 
as to the human species.88 
Hume is insisting that the act of mind called belief is 
necessarily derived from the "influence of custom on the 
imagination." How does this claim harmonize with a claim 
previously discussed (on page 60) "that all belief arises 
from the association of ideas"? 
Another interesting point found in the quote is Hume's 
belief that whatever principles are operating through 
'custom' must be the same for beasts as for humans. That 
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Hume seems to be arguing for some kind of natural or lawlike 
necessity becomes clear when in the next paragraph he 
asserts: 
To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing 
but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our 
souls, which carries us along a certain train of 
ideas, and endows them with particular 
qualities,90 
In this case, has Hume pushed to its logical conclusion 
Malebranche's claim that God ought to establish very simple 
and general laws concerning the union of soul and body? 
Once humans are considered as part of the causal system we 
call 'nature,' as natural organisms, then human cognitive 
experiences should manifest certain lawlike traits. Thus, 
the species of reasoning being considered here is an 
expression of natural necessity--it is "one of the 
principles of nature, and derives all its force from that 
origin."91 
Later, in 'Of skepticism with regard to reason' he 
states this conclusion in the strongest and clearest terms 
possible. 
Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable 
necessity had determin'd us to judge as well as to 
breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear 
viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller 
light, upon account of their customary connexion 
with a present impression, than we can hinder 
ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, 
or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our 
eyes towards them in broad sunshine.92 
In these statements (along with the previous ones) it is 
clear that by associating the word 'custom' with terms like 
"instinct," "absolute," and ''uncontrollable" Hume is giving 
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this word a different content than that established or 
acknowledged by ordinary linguistic usage. Furthermore, if 
we compare the claims Hume makes in regard to custom and the 
principle of association, it suggest that they have the same 
meaning for him. 
Now we have seen that during this ad hoc search Hume 
realizes that imagination is the faculty through which 
experience and the principles of association combine in a 
"secret operation" to produce a belief in cause and effect. 
One element that contributes to this sense of 'secrecy' is 
the fact that the principles of association work 
prereflectively, or as Hume puts it "without allowing any 
time for reflection." In his concluding section on this 
subject, Hume identifies another reason why the idea of 
necessity seems to be hidden. 
The idea of necessity arises from some impression. 
There is no impression convey'd by our senses, 
which can give rise to that idea. It must, 
therefore, be deriv'd from some internal 
impression, or impression of reflexion.93 
Evidently, this impression originates spontaneously in the 
mind and thus is not to be found in the objects with which 
it is usually identified. 
The Origin of Internal Impressions 
Hume is amazed when, at the end of his ad hoc search, 
he realizes that "Necessity, then . is nothing but an 
internal impression of the mind."94 He fears others will 
reject the conclusion he believes follows from this fact: 
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"Upon the whole., necessity is something, that exists in the 
mind, not in objects."95 In an attempt to make himself 
clear he draws an analogy: 
Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two 
equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal 
to two right ones, lies only in the act of the 
understanding, by which we consider and compare 
these ideas; in like manner the necessity or 
power, which unites causes and effects, lies in 
the determination of the mind to pass from the one 
to the other.96 
In this quote Hurne is struggling to "say new things," and 
the point of the analogy is that the idea of necessary 
connection originates in how the mind is determined to work. 
Hume immediately admits that by asserting that the real 
power of causes "belongs entirely to the soul"97 he is 
advancing a paradox of incredible "violence" against the 
common "prejudices of mankind." Nevertheless, against those 
who would accuse him of reversing "the order of nature,"98 
he argues that: 
Tis a common observation, that the mind has a 
great propensity to spread itself on external 
objects, and to conjoin with them any internal 
impressions, which they occasion (possibly 
quoting from Malebranche) .99 
Hume is painfully aware that his attempt to say "new things" 
about human understanding has brought him into conflict with 
the existing presuppositions concerning causality. But this 
kind of problem is what the reader would expect by my 
interpretation. 
An interesting thing to note about the new things Hume 
is attempting to say is the way it anticipates Kant's own 
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Copernican revolution. Contra his original empiricist's 
presupposition Hume is claiming that the 'experience' from 
which we derive the idea of cause and effect is a product of 
two different sources: sense impressions (experience) and 
internal impressions (custom). In response to those who 
dispute this claim, I would first agree; at this point there 
is not convincing textual evidence. However, it is not yet 
clear what Hurne means by the phrase "internal impression." 
In other words, I believe that Hume gave the phrase 
'internal impression' a genealogical meaning which, in this 
case, is contrasted with those impressions which originate 
outside of our bodies. My claim is supported by a 
description Hume puts in the mouth of an imaginary opponent: 
Thought may well depend on causes for its 
operation, but not causes on thought. This is to 
reverse the order of nature, and make that 
secondary, which is really primary. To every 
operation there is a power proportion'd; and this 
power must be plac'd on the body, that operates. 
If we remove the power from one cause, we must 
ascribe it to another: But to remove it from all 
causes, and bestow it on a being, that is no ways 
related to the cause or effect, but by perceiving 
them, is a gross absurdity,lOO 
Basically, Hume's opponent is upset that Hume is claiming 
that the concept of causality originates from out of our own 
being and not from the objects. If my reading is right, 
then Kant's distinction between a priori and~ posteriori 
actually clarifies and develops a distinction Hume was 
attempting to make. Furthermore--and this bears directly on 
the lack of textual support for my claim--the idea of 
necessary connection is just the first, out of a set of 
internal impressions, which Hume will identify. 
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Before examining the third section of Hume's 
investigation into human beliefs and their causes, it would 
be good to summarize what we have learned up to this point. 
Hume is attempting to reconceptualize human understanding by 
rooting it in human nature. He wants to show that 
fundamental beliefs like causality are a natural product of 
the human species acting in accordance with "simple laws 
concerning the union of soul and body." The unknown forces 
which produce these beliefs he calls custom or the principle 
of association. However, the reader must not understand the 
former word with the meaning it has today (the latter is an 
example of a terminological idiom and is also 
misunderstood) . Both of these words may have indicated for 
Hume a mechanistic substratum which secretly but necessarily 
influences, via the imagination, the cognitive beliefs 
humans come to hold. Hume uses these phrases to indicate 
the way nature forces us to hold certain beliefs even 
against our will. 
Imagination Overwhelms Its Competitors 
These findings should be kept in mind as we turn to the 
third part of my investigation in which Hume attempts to 
answer the question: "What causes induce us to believe in 
the existence of body?"lOl Since he has framed his question 
in terms of causes and not "Whether there be body or 
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not?"l02 he attempts to find an answer by identifying those 
sources from which this belief may arise. He identifies 
senses, reason, or the imagination as the only possible 
sources capable of producing "the opinion of a continu'd or 
of a distinct existence."103 
By a process of elimination Hume quickly establishes 
that imagination is the only faculty from which this belief 
may arise. Against the senses he argues that: 
these faculties are incapable of giving rise to 
the notion of the continu'd existence of their 
objectsi after they no longer appear to the 
senses. 04 
He believes that it would be a contradiction to insist that 
the senses could give rise to the belief in the continued 
existence of objects when the senses by their very nature 
can only produce ''internal and perishing existence."105 
Interestingly enough, against reason or philosophical 
principles he argues that: 
whatever convincing arguments philosophers may 
fancy they can produce to establish the belief of 
objects independent of the mind, 'tis obvious 
·these arguments are known but to very few, and 
that 'tis not by them, that children, peasants, 
and the greatest part of mankind are induc'd to 
attribute objects to some impressions, and deny 
them to others.106 
I find this interesting since his objection against a 
philosophical justification of this belief assumes that it 
must be produced by some natural principle applicable to 
everyone who holds this belief, even if they are incapable 
of grasping the philosophical arguments produced to support 
this belief. Since everyone who holds to this belief is not 
I 
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aware of the philosophical justifications given for it, then 
it must have been produced through some other cause. 
The avenue through which humans acquire this belief is 
imagination. But how is it produced? Hume tries to 
philosophically account for its production in terms of 
constancy and coherence,l07 but I believe that his own 
explanation is open to the same objections he made against a 
philosophical production of this belief--would children and 
peasants explain it in these terms? For example, in the 
earlier example, involving the man on a journey who comes to 
a river, Hume denied that his causal reasoning involved an 
explicit check on past experiences. Similarly, our belief 
in the continued existence of objects is not a product of 
our self-consciously noticing that our sense impressions 
manifest a constancy and coherence. This explanation would 
not be understandable to children and peasants, yet they too 
believe in the existence of external objects. 
Observing the Distinction: Strike One 
Hume does make a more promising observation when he 
remarks on the difference between the way we derive a belief 
in causal reasoning from custom and past experiences, and 
the way we derive a belief in the continued existence of 
objects. He describes it thus: 
we shall find upon examination, that they are at 
the bottom considerably different from each other, 
and that this inference arises from the 
understanding, and from custom in an indirect and 
oblique manner.108 
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This recognition on Hume's part provided him with the 
opportunity to make a distinction between the different kind 
of roles imagination has in human cognitive experiences. 
Our belief in continued existence of objects can be 
distinguished from our causal beliefs by the greater degree 
of conviction with which we hold them. But this fact 
creates a problem for Hume's position. Here is his 
description of the problem: 
'tis not only impossible, that any habit shou'd 
ever be acquir'd otherwise than by the regular 
succession of these perceptions, but also that any 
habit shou'd exceed that degree of regularity. 
Any degree, therefore, of regularity in our 
perceptions, can never be a foundation for us to 
infer a greater degree of regularity in some 
objects, which are not perceiv'd; since this 
supposes a contradiction, viz. a habit acquir'd by 
what was never present to the mind.109 
Hume is wondering how humans acquired a habit of thought 
which is more regular than what is present to the mind 
through our impressions? 
Hume combines these observations with several already 
made in regarding causal reasoning. The first concerns the 
way causal reasoning "arises only from custom."llO However, 
in this case, custom itself was only the effect of past 
impressions. Because of these differences between the two 
beliefs he concludes that the belief in the continued 
existence of objects "must arise from the co-operation of 
some other principles."lll 
How should Hume proceed here? Should he attempt to 
trace this belief to a prior impression like he did with the 
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idea of necessary connection? But this would create a 
problem, since Hume has already established that the 
regularity which characterizes this belief is not derived 
from custom. Thus, this move does not appear to be a live 
option. Nevertheless, Hume's previous reasonings have shown 
him that imagination is the only faculty through which this 
belief may be produced. What principle expressing itself 
through the imagination could produce this belief? 
Hume's initial answer is to direct the reader to an 
earlier section of the Treatise where he has already 
observed that the imagination: 
when set into any train of thinking, is apt to 
continue, even when its object fails it, and like 
a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its 
course without any new impulse.112 
Hume is suggesting that once imagination has acquired a 
habit of thought, it has an inherent propensity to develop 
this line of thinking to its fullest expression. Thus, 
as the mind is once in the train of observing an 
uniformity among objects, it naturally continues, 
till it renders the uniformity as compleat as 
possible.113 
Evidently, objects appear in our perceptions to present a 
limited kind of uniformity which is then taken over and 
fully developed by this inner propensity of the imagination. 
Though this natural propensity of the imagination will allow 
Hume to explain how humans obtain a habit that was "never 
present to the mind," it still is not entirely acceptable. 
This initial answer seems problematic since it does not 
distinguish between those trains of thought we call 
'reveries' and those trains of thought which we call 
'reality.' Hume admits that this principle alone is too 
"weak to support so vast an edifice"ll4 as the whole of 
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external existence, and he launches into what he calls some 
"profound reasoning," in which he attempts to develop a 
satisfactory account of how this belief is produced. 
Observing the Distinction: Strike Two 
The first difficulty Hume encounters is how to account 
for the relation of identity. Hume describes the difficulty 
in terms of number and unity: 
After one object is suppos'd to exist, we must 
either suppose another also to exist; in which 
case we have the idea of number: Or we must 
suppose it not to exist; in which case the first 
object remains at unity.ll5 
Hume attempts to use the idea of time to remove this 
difficulty. In discussing time he writes: 
I have already observ'dl, that time, in a strict 
sense, implies succession, and that when we apply 
its idea to any unchangeable object, 'tis only by 
a fiction of the i~agination, by which the 
unchangeable object is suppos'd to participate in 
the changes of the co-existent objects, and in 
particular of that of our perceptions. This 
fiction of the imagination almost universally 
takes place; and 'tis by means of it, that a 
single object, plac'd before us, and survey'd for 
any time without our discovering in it any 
interruption or variation, is able to give us a 
notion of identity.ll6 
Hume believes that the idea of time can act as a "medium 
betwixt unity and number." But its ability to mediate 
between the two is dependent upon a fiction of the 
imagination which "almost universally takes place.~ 
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Immediately afterwards Hume asks a question concerning 
the source of this fiction of the imagination which "almost 
universally takes place." His response? 
I must here recall an observation, which I have 
already prov'd and explain'dl. Nothing is more 
apt to make us mistake one idea for another, than 
any relation betwixt them, which associates them 
together in the imagination, and makes it pass 
with facility from one to the other. Of all 
relations that of resemblance is in this respect 
the most efficacious: and that because it not 
only causes an association of ideas, but also of 
dispositions, and makes us conceive the one idea 
by an act or operation of the mind, similar to 
that by which we conceive the other. This 
circumstance I have observ'd to be of great 
moment;117 
Once again Hume identifies the principle of association as 
the initial impetus for a fundamental belief. In this case, 
the relation which acts through the imagination is 
resemblance. 
That Hume needs, at this fundamental point in his 
investigation, to appeal once again to the relationship 
between the principle of association and the imagination is 
from the perspective of this paper very noteworthy and 
significant. But just as noteworthy are the two footnotes 
which Hume gives in both of the quotes just examined. In 
both footnotes Hurne refers the reader to a portion of the 
Treatise in which he explicitly discusses the connection 
between his Cartesian philosophy of the brain and the 
relation of resemblance (this quote was listed earlier in 
the thesis, on page twelve). I find this fascinating 
because whenever Hume's system runs into difficulties he 
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often makes reference to this mechanistic grounding as his 
trump card. By combining the claims made in these two 
quotes the reader can discover just how central (and hidden) 
a Cartesian philosophy of the brain is to Hume's overall 
system. 
To support my previous claim concerning the centrality 
of a Cartesian philosophy of the brain let me list without 
comment the concepts he associates with this Cartesian 
picture of the brain: the principle of association, 
imagination's propensity to continue in a train of thought, 
prereflective operations of the mind, the causal inference, 
the imagination's fiction of the unchangeable object, and 
the universality which characterizes most of the items on 
this list. Most of these concepts play a significant role 
as either a part of his philosophical system or as the 
fundamental beliefs characterizing human understanding. And 
it is the latter beliefs that motivate his attempt to 
provide a philosophical account of how they come about. 
Observing the Distinction: 
Strike Three, You Are Out 
But the last quote is also significant because it 
records Hume's effort to introduce something new into his 
account. Let me repeat the significant portion. 
Of all relations that of resemblance is in this 
respect the most efficacious: and that because it 
not only causes an association of ideas, but also 
of dispositions, and makes us conceive the one 
idea by an act or operation of the mind, similar 
to that by which we conceive the other. 
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I believe that in this instance a dispositional account of 
belief acquisition is more accurate than any of the previous 
accounts Hume has offered. Our belief in the continued 
existence of objects is neither characterized by a forceful 
impression nor reducible to any one impression. If this is 
admitted, then a dispositional description would fit the 
phenomenal characteristics of this belief. 
Furthermore, dispositions are the results of many years 
of living and all this includes. Most of us have acquired 
dispositions through a process we would be hard pressed to 
describe. But this fact is an important one to note in 
light of Hume's Cartesian philosophy of the brain. On the 
Cartesian model the animal spirits were the tiniest particle 
in the body and worked on the brain in a manner similar to 
erosion. Thus, as the sensory organs were stimulated, they 
sent tiny animal spirits to the brain, which in turn left an 
imperceptible trace on the brain tissue. With the 
repetition of similar experiences the first faint brain 
traces begin to deepen. Malebranche believed it was through 
this process of deepening that our ideas became both 
livelier and distinct. Therefore, on Hume's model he could 
explain the process through which ideas or beliefs acquire 
their vivacity or forcefulness-and still account for the 
fact that he was not able to trace it back to a particular 
impression occurring presently. 
In other words, he could have made a distinction 
between the principle of association and custom. The former 
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referred to the causal connection between brain traces, 
animal spirits, and ideas. But the latter refers to the 
process by which the animal spirits established and deepened 
certain brain traces. Once established these traces would 
offer little or no resistance to the flow of animal spirits 
corning from the sensory organs. Thus, the ideas associated 
with these brain traces are characterized by a certain force 
or vivacity. 
If this is possible, it creates an opportunity to make 
a distinction between resemblance as it relates to the 
associating of sensory perceptions and as it relates to 
mental dispositions. In a footnote Hurne draws attention to 
the possibility of this distinction, but he fails to develop 
it. All he writes is: 
We may observe, that there are two relations, and 
both of them resemblances, which contribute to our 
mistaking the succession of our interrupted 
perceptions for an identical object. The first 
is, the resemblance of the perception: The second 
is the resemblance, which the act of the mind in 
surveying a succession of resembling objects bears 
to that in surveying an identical object.l18 
Hurne's point is that if the mind finds itself to be in a 
similar state of disposition when surveying two similar but 
different situations, then the resemblance that obtains 
between these two dispositional states may initiate an "easy 
transition or passage of the irnagination."119 
Instead of pursuing and developing this distinction, 
Hurne focuses on the role of memory in producing the belief 
in the continued existence of objects. Later he does make a 
couple of scattered remarks about how the belief in 
continued existence "has taken such deep root in the 
imagination, that 'tis impossible ever to eradicate it"120 
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and that we "embrace it by a kind of instinct or natural 
impulse."121 Both of these comments could be interpreted in 
terms of the distinction suggested earlier in regard to 
custom and the principle of association. 
Personal Identity is Nothing New 
Hume's discussion of personal identity was modeled on 
his previous discussion of how our belief in the continued 
existence of objects is produced. However, in this case he 
almost identifies memory "as the source of personal 
identity."l22 What prevents him from doing this is the 
realization that we can imagine existing at some time in the 
past without being able to remember any specific detail 
concerning that period of time. This realization causes him 
to identify memory as a necessary but not sufficient cause. 
As he puts it, "memory does not so much produce as discover 
personal identity."123 So, how is the idea of personal 
identity produced? 
Identity depends on the relations of ideas: 
and these relations produce identit1~ by means of 
that easy transition they occasion. 4 
Once again we see that Hume's philosophy is grounded in the 
hidden but productive abilities the principle of association 
has on the faculty of imagination. 
The reason my reading highlighted the opportunities 
Hume had for making a distinction among those principles 
which influenced the imagination is that Hume himself is 
aware of this need. 
In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in 
the imagination betwixt the principles which are 
permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as 
the customary transition from causes to effects, 
and from effects to causes: And the principles, 
which are changeable, weak, and irregular; such as 
those I have just now taken notice of. The former 
are the foundation of all our thought and actions, 
so that upon their removal human nature must 
immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are 
neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or 
so much as useful in the conduct of life.125 
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Throughout his investigation Hume was haunted by the need to 
make clear exactly how these distinctions should be applied 
to human understanding. On my reading, if he had pursued 
this distinction, he may have produced Kant's transcendental 
philosophy. 
CHAPTER V 
THE NEW HUME AND THE OLD KANT 
Building a Bridge 
The motivating belief behind this thesis can now be 
expressed in a more specific manner. Hume's description of 
the way the principles of association interface with the 
imagination in producing basic cognitive beliefs is 
remarkably similar to the description Kant will later 
express in his Critique. 
With Hume we have discovered a philosopher who not only 
sees but also tries to describe the two radically different 
roles imagination plays in the human cognitive experience. 
Going against his empiricist presupposition Hume anticipates 
Kant's claim that the genealogy of some of our ideas cannot 
be traced "to vulgar origins in common experience."l26 Hume 
agrees with this assessment and draws attention to the way 
that the idea of necessary connection did not originate in 
any "impressions convey'd by the senses" but expressed a 
determination of the mind. He even compares this 
determination of the mind with that manifested by 
mathematical necessity. 
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One can also discern in Burne an attempt to display how 
the two radically different senses of imagination relate to 
the empiricist understanding of 'common experience'. There 
is the modern conception of reproductive imagination by 
which we humans daydream or fantasize. The images self-
consciously willed originate a posteriori and fall in the 
category Burne described as "changeable, weak, and 
irregular." This a posteriori kind of relationship which a 
weak conception of imagination has with 'common experience' 
should not be confused with the strong conception of 
imagination and the way it makes possible 'common 
experience.' In the latter case it operates productively 
acting "before we have time for reflection" and making 
possible our 'common experience' of both personal identity 
and external objects. 
If Burne had followed up on the numerous observations he 
made concerning the different role imagination played in 
producing our belief in the continued existence of objects 
--from the way it produced our belief in cause and effect, 
or even reveries--then he might have said something similar 
to Kant. Nevertheless, he does picture imagination as doing 
double duty in our cognitive experience. Originally it 
creates the pseudo-observation of objects which "have an 
existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception,"l27 and 
then it turns back on its source in the form of custom 
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causing imagination to create an expectation which gets 
expressed in the form of a causal rule. 
In both these cases the principle of association uses 
imagination, even against our will, to produce certain 
beliefs, as Hume makes clear in the section on personal 
identity. In this section he clearly uses this productive 
characteristic as grounds for making a distinction. But he 
could have discussed how the principle of resemblance 
produced in us a disposition which, when similar in 
different situations, would also initiate a transition in 
the imagination. One should not fail to notice that Hume 
often compared the kind of necessity which he identified 
with the production of these beliefs to instinct. In other 
words, they express a natural necessity generally 
characteristic of the human species considered as a natural 
organism and expressing the very general and simple laws 
concerning the union of soul and body. 
Can we compare Hume's fundamental principles in the 
imagination which "upon their removal human nature must 
immediately perish and go to ruin" with what Kant calls the 
transcendental imqgination (over against the empirical 
imagination)? Hume believes these principles are 
"permanent, irresistible, and universal." Kant could have 
agreed with this statement. Could Kant have agreed with 
Hume's conclusion? 
The memory, senses, and understanding are, 
therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, 
or the vivacity of our ideas.l28 
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Though Kant would have rejected Hume's vivacity thesis, 
could he have accepted Hume's findings concerning those 
principles which irresistibly produce through the 
imagination certain basic cognitive beliefs? Does 
imagination play an important role in Kant's description of 
human understanding? Hopefully I will pursue this subject 
at a later time. 
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